Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian forces’ battlefield performance to assert that Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable. These claims continue to be divorced from the battlefield reality on the ground, however.

Putin insisted that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the frontline and that Russian forces are making rapid gains, contrary to all observable evidence from the battlefield.

Putin is likely aware that he appears detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine and has attempted to present himself as an informed leader.

Putin once again reiterated Russia’s continued unwillingness to freeze the current frontline or engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi released a statement of priorities for the Ukrainian military that outlines the focus on unifying operational planning to contest Russia’s initiative and bolster Ukraine’s long-term defensive capabilities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces Major General Gennady Shapovalov and appointed Brigadier General Svyatoslav Zaitsya as his replacement on September 2.

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Security Service (SBU) elements engaged in a small arms firefight in Kyiv City on September 2.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and the Slovyansk direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, an unspecified number of S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 174 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

US efforts to restore freedom of navigation appear to be having some success in challenging Iran’s ability to enforce control over the Strait of Hormuz. Increased commercial vessel transit levels indicate that Iran is having difficulty in preventing some commercial vessels from using the southern route. Iran may seek alternative ways to demonstrate or restore control over the strait as the United States challenges Iran’s ability to threaten vessels.

The roughly 50 percent reported failure rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Jordan on September 1 may reflect the degradation of Iran’s longer-range missile capabilities.

The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 1 that Russia has been covertly helping Iran develop advanced cruise missile technology since around November 2023. Iran’s development and operationalization of this technology would likely improve its ability to threaten US land and naval assets in the region. Developing supersonic cruise missile technology takes substantial time, and it is currently unclear how far along Iran is in developing this technology.

Iran is likely pursuing two separate but related lines of effort to advance Iranian objectives in Iraq amid Iraqi government efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iran reportedly pushed unspecified Iraqi government actors and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to reach a settlement in which the militias would “discreetly” retain their weapons by storing them either in Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-controlled depots or in the militias’ own depots under the condition that they would not use them without PMF approval. Iran is also reportedly pursuing a plan to build a new cadre of smaller, more ideological militias over which Iran would have strong control.

For decades, American light-bulb factories resisted the foreign competition that was wiping out industry after industry. Then, in less than 15 years, the domestic industry collapsed.

Cheap Chinese labor doesn’t explain it. So what changed?

It’s a revealing case study in how America lost industrial capacity to China.

Full story: https://puresource.substack.com/p/china-didnt-kill-american-light-bulbs

Key Takeaways:

The piece argues Beijing’s 2026 SCS pressure leans on People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia trawlers—AMTI counted a 2025 daily average of 241 vessels, steel hulls at Whitsun and Mischief, and formations up to 470 km—plus water cannon and clashes near Scarborough, keeping the gray zone below open war.

Gregory Poling (AMTI) and RSIS’s Thomas Lim say the tactic outnumbers regional coast guards and flips the “who escalated” script if Manila uses force on “fishing” boats; China still ignores the 2016 tribunal ruling.

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are answering with radar, satellites, AIS, concentrated presence at Second Thomas and Scarborough, and partners (Japan, ROK, U.S.) rather than a hull-for-hull race.

“[…] The Russian president is waging war against the West, and organized crime networks are becoming an ever more important tool in this conflict. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to tell the security services from the criminal gangs. […]”

Key Takeaways

Iran struck US and allied bases and assets in the region on September 1 in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian military targets, including radars, on the same day. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) strikes appeared to focus on assets that Iran uses to sense ships to strike.

US strikes on radars will likely impose operational constraints on Iranian forces attempting to disrupt shipping in the strait. ISW-CTP previously assessed on August 31 that Iran was facing operational constraints on its ability to disrupt shipping in the strait.

The Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 indicate that Iran has some capacity to disrupt shipping through the southern route to exit the Strait of Hormuz. The three Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 do not necessarily imply that Iran faces no constraints, only that it overcame them in those three instances. ISW-CTP will continue to monitor the rate of strikes and the tactical choices involved in each strike to evaluate whether Iran is facing tactical constraints as it attempts to disrupt shipping.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian may have sought military and economic aid for Iran during meetings with world leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31 and September 1.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces’ rate of advance marginally increased in August 2026, but Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited.

Russian forces continued to suffer a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains.

Senior German officials and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly attributed the August 5 drone attack targeting Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.

Additional details regarding Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi’s efforts to erect new operational commands to defend Donetsk Oblast are emerging.

Russian forces are shifting their strike tactics to maximize civilian harm by leveraging jet-powered drones over slower and less effective piston-engine-driven drones, likely because jet-powered drones are more difficult to intercept.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is augmenting the force that ensures his personal safety and the security of Russian high-ranking officials.

Putin conducted a substantial reshuffle within Russian law enforcement agencies on August 31, likely in preparation for potential mobilization following the State Duma elections.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 1.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and military assets.

Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles, Zirkon anti-ship missiles, Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and Banderol-type loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.

Russian forces also launched 218 Shahed-type strike drones overnight on August 31 to September 1 and 99 strike drones during the day on September 1.

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I’m not sure how much the mainstream media is covering the fact that are pacific theaters now more vulnerable. USS George Washington, which was our only aircraft carrier in the Pacific since arrived on station in the Middle East to release the USS Abraham Lincoln. So China wants to make move on Taiwan, now would be the time we are weakened because of our under supply munitions in several theaters.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces are intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian airfields and drone launch sites while conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) in Russia’s border regions to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a clearing mission with foot-mobile infantry in the Kupyansk direction, likely following a condition-setting effort aimed at suppressing Russian drone strike capabilities in the area.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian marketplaces continues to impose high financial and operational costs on Russian logistics chains and the Russian economy writ large.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Slovyansk directions.

Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 130 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on the night of August 29 to 30.